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Abstract
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to malicious
inputs crafted by an adversary to produce erroneous outputs.
Works on securing neural networks against adversarial ex-
amples achieve high empirical robustness on simple datasets
such as MNIST. However, these techniques are inadequate
when empirically tested on complex data sets such as CIFAR-
10 and SVHN. Further, existing techniques are designed to
target specific attacks and fail to generalize across attacks.
We propose Adversarial Model Cascades (AMC) as a way to
tackle the above inadequacies. Our approach trains a cascade
of models sequentially where each model is optimized to be
robust towards a mixture of multiple attacks. Ultimately, it
yields a single model which is secure against a wide range
of attacks; namely FGSM, Elastic, Virtual Adversarial Per-
turbations and Madry. On an average, AMC increases the
model’s empirical robustness against various attacks simul-
taneously, by a significant margin (of 6.225% for MNIST,
5.075% for SVHN and 2.65% for CIFAR10). At the same
time, the model’s performance on non-adversarial inputs is
comparable to the state-of-the-art models.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have found widespread usage
in areas such as computer vision, natural language process-
ing, and computational biology. While their performance
matches (or exceeds) human evaluations on the same tasks,
sensitive applications such as autonomous navigation and
computational finance require a deeper understanding of the
predictions before their results can be considered trustwor-
thy. However, since DNNs work by learning non-trivial rep-
resentations of data, the intermediate representations and
feature spaces of these networks have become increasingly
complex. As a result, there is scope for vulnerabilities to be
introduced into the networks, leading to a host of privacy and
security concerns. For DNNs, one of the ways these vulnera-
bilities have been exploited is through adversarial examples.
Adversarial examples, while being indistinguishable to hu-
mans from a clean example, can cause DNNs to produce
incorrect and, in some cases, disastrous results.
Furthermore, adversarial examples that misguide one
model are often successful in deceiving other models that
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are trained to perform the same task; irrespective of their ar-
chitectures or the data sets used to train either of them (Pa-
pernot et al. 2017). Attackers may, therefore, conduct an at-
tack with minimal to no knowledge about the target model,
by training a substitute model to craft adversarial examples
and nonetheless succeed in deceiving the target model.
Liu et al. propose an ensemble-based approach to gener-
ate adversarial examples using an ensemble-based approach
and claim high attack rates. They also show transferability
of these targeted examples in a black-box setting, where the
target model’s weights and architectures are unknown (Liu
et al. 2016). Bhagoji et al. (Bhagoji et al. 2017) propose an
alternate method to exploit DNNs via gradient estimation,
which, by their results, performs nearly as good as white-
box adversarial attacks, while outperforming the then exist-
ing state-of-the-art attacks on black-box models. Tramer et
al. use an ensemble of models to increase the robustness of
the target model (Trame`r et al. 2017). However, they use pre-
trained models to transfer examples, and do not consider the
scenario involving adaptive adversaries.
The above vulnerabilities have inspired a lot of research
on securing neural networks against such attacks. Although
a number of defence strategies have been proposed in the re-
cent past, many of them can be broken when the adversary
adapts the attack to consider the defence. The most promi-
nent among these strategies is adversarial training (Madry
et al. 2017) where the model is trained with adversarial sam-
ples generated by attacks, along with the standard set of
training examples. One of the crucial shortcomings of this
approach is that due to over-fitting on samples from stronger
attacks, the model may still be vulnerable to adversarial ex-
amples from weaker attacks (Goodfellow 2018). In turn, this
hinders the above methods from generalizing to multiple at-
tacks.
It is also worth mentioning that there have been attempts
to construct models which are secure by construction. This
is achieved by exploiting the structural properties of DNNs.
Owing to additional operations for such structural changes,
these approaches are computationally expensive and scale
only to models on simpler data sets such as MNIST. (Raghu-
nathan, Steinhardt, and Liang 2018), (Wong and Kolter
2018), (Sinha, Namkoong, and Duchi 2017). Although
these approaches increase the robustness of a model for sim-
pler data sets, these strategies are ineffective for complex
datasets such as CIFAR-10 and SVHN.
In this work, we build on the adversarial training frame-
work, and design a training technique called Adversarial
Model Cascades (AMC). One of the key contributions of
our paper is that, in addition to the traditional white-box set-
ting, we also consider an adaptive black-box adversary that
makes use of queries to the target model’s prediction func-
tion to train a proxy model. We demonstrate that AMC im-
proves the prior arts empirical worst-case accuracy for sev-
eral data sets namely MNIST, CIFAR10 and SVHN.
In addition to the above, we also investigate the suitabil-
ity of Feature Squeezing (Xu, Evans, and Qi 2017) as a pre-
processing technique in the pipeline to improving the empir-
ical robustness of DNNs. It is important to note that Feature
Squeezing as a stand-alone defence has been shown to be
easily bypassed (Sharma and Chen 2018). In contrast, when
used in conjunction with our framework, we observe that
Feature Squeezing effectively improves the accuracy against
stronger attacks that the model has seen during training. Our
work is the first to demonstrate an end to end pipeline to
improve the empirical robustness of DNNs against multiple
attacks simultaneously.
2 Background
2.1 Threat Model
Consider a DNN f(.; θ) and a clean (no adversarial noise)
sample (~x, y) ∼ D′, where D′ is a proxy for an unknown
distribution D, from which the set of samples used to train
the target model f(~x; θ) are drawn. An adversary tries to cre-
ate a malicious sample ~xadv by adding a small perturbation
to ~x, such that ~x and ~xadv are close according to some dis-
tance metric (either L1, L2 or L∞ norm), and f(~xadv) 6= y.
In each domain, the distance metric that we must use is dif-
ferent. In the space of images, which we focus on in this pa-
per, we rely on previous work that suggests that various Lp
norms are reasonable approximations of human perceptual
distance (Carlini and Wagner 2017).
For our analyses, we consider two threat-model settings:
white-box and adaptive black-box. A white-box adversary
is one that has access to the target model’s weights and the
training data set. An adaptive black-box adversary is one
that interacts with the target model only through its pre-
dictive interface. This adaptive black-box adversary trains
a proxy model fP (~x′; θ′) on the set S ′ = {(~x′i, y′i)}ni=1 ,
where ~x′i’s are drawn i.i.d from distribution D′ and yi =
f(~x′i; θ). In this setting, the adversary crafts adversarial ex-
amples ~xadv on the proxy model fP (~x′; θ′) using white-box
attack strategies and uses these malicious examples to try
and fool the target model f(~x; θ).
2.2 Adversarial Examples
Given a clean sample ~x it is often possible to find a malicious
sample ~xadv , such that f(~xadv; θ) 6= y, and ~xadv is close to
~x according to some distance metric (either L1, L2 or L∞
norm).
For our analyses, we consider the following attacks:
• Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM): Uses the gradi-
ent of a modified loss function to modify samples, con-
strained by L∞ norm (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy
2014).
• Virtual Adversarial Perturbations (VAP): VAP per-
turbs ~x in the direction that can most severely damage
the probability that the model correctly assigns the label
y (the correct label) to ~x (Miyato et al. 2015).
• Elastic Adversarial Perturbations (EAP): EAP is based
on elastic-net regularization, which uses a mixture of L1
and L2 penalty functions (Chen et al. 2017).
• Projected Gradient Method (PGM): Uses projected
gradient descent (PGD) on the negative loss func-
tion (Madry et al. 2017).
These four attacks are picked so as to cover the spec-
trum of adversarial attacks in literature. Examples for each
of these attacks are shown in Figure 1. One can also char-
acterize attacks based on their strength, i.e. how easy or
hard it is to defend against adversarial examples generated
by the attacks. For example, VAP and FGSM are generally
regarded as weak attacks as many defences proposed in lit-
erature have been demonstrated to be effective against VAP
and FGSM attacks, as opposed to PGM which is harder to
defend against.
Mathematically, all attacks can be viewed as solving the
same optimization problem: an adversary tries to create a
malicious sample ~xadv by adding a small perturbation to ~x,
such that ~x and ~xadv are close according to some distance
metric (either L1, L2 or L∞ norm), and f(~xadv; θ) 6= y.
Thus, the strength of an attack can be measured by how
closely it can approximate the true optima of the above op-
timization problem.
Figure 1: Examples with various perturbations generated via
various attacks for all three datasets. All of these perturbed
images make the target model misclassify. L to R: Unper-
turbed, FGSM, EAP, PGM, VAP. Top to Bottom: MNIST,
SVHN, CIFAR-10.
2.3 Defences
Although many defence strategies to secure DNNs against
adversaries have been proposed in the recent past, many
of them can be broken when the adversary adapts the at-
tack to take the defence into consideration. The most promi-
nent among these strategies is adversarial training (Shaham,
Yamada, and Negahban 2015) where the model is trained
with adversarial samples generated by attacks along with the
standard set of training examples.
Adversarial Training Adversarial training hardens the
model against malicious examples by either re-training the
model on an augmented set containing the training data and
the adversarial examples or learning using the modified ob-
jective function:
Jˆ(θ; ~x, y) = α.J(θ; ~x, y) + (1− α).J(θ; ~xadv, y)
where J(θ; ~x, y) is the original loss function and α is a
tunable hyperparameter. This defence aims to increase the
model’s robustness by ensuring that it predicts the same
class for a clean example and its corresponding example
with adversarial perturbation.
As opposed to the general practice of adding adversar-
ial examples without replacement, we add them with re-
placement. This helps us achieve better generalization per-
formance over an unseen test-set.
input: An attack A, training set D, total number of
epochs N, a model with parameters θ, and
learning rate η
begin
for i← 1 to N do
Generate adversarial examples for samples in D
using A, {~xadv}
θ ← θ −∇θJˆ(θ; ~x ∪ ~xadv, y)
end
end
Algorithm 1: A high-level overview of the the adversarial
training procedure AT(A, D, N, η, θ)
Intuitively, the algorithm iteratively does the following
two steps
• Find the optimal ~xadv such that f(~xadv; θ) 6= y
• Optimizes θ, over the worst case adversarial example
f(~x ∪ ~x∗adv; θ) 6= y
Many of the earlier formulations of adversarial train-
ing have been easily bypassed in practice; this has been
attributed to the sharpness of the loss around the training
examples. Only until recently, Madry et. al. (Madry et al.
2017) showed that adversarial training could be used to ob-
tain a robust MNIST model. That is, the worst-case accu-
racy on MNIST adversarial examples could be no lower than
81%, even though the attacker knows all parameters of the
model. Although their results are encouraging, their tech-
nique still falls short in three aspects:
1. it is ineffective against adaptive black-box adver-
saries (Trame`r et al. 2017), (Goodfellow 2018),
2. it is ineffective for complex datasets such as CIFAR-10
and SVHN. (Madry et al. 2017), and
3. it fails to generalize across attacks (Goodfellow 2018).
3 Approach
To address this challenge, we propose Adversarial Model
Cascades (AMC) which can help secure models against
adaptive black-box attacks. Our approach is to train a cas-
cade of models by injecting images crafted from an already
defended proxy model (or from the target model itself) to
improve the robustness against adversarial attacks. In the
next section, we describe the critical steps involved in our
approach; namely the construction of the proxy models and
the adversarial model cascades.
3.1 Proxy Models
One of the critical steps in our proposed approach is to train
a proxy (or surrogate) model to mimic the target model. The
strategy is to train a proxy for the target model using unla-
beled examples from the proxy distribution D′. The labels
for these data points are obtained by observing the target
model's output on these examples. Then, adversarial exam-
ples are crafted for this proxy. We expect the target model
to misclassify them due to transferability between architec-
tures (Papernot et al. 2017).
One may believe that the choice of a neural network ar-
chitecture plays a vital role in the effectiveness of the proxy
model and the adversary might find it hard to decide on
a suitable one. However, the adversary has some partial
knowledge of the oracle input (e.g., images, text) and ex-
pected output (e.g., classification) at the very least. The ad-
versary can thus use an architecture adapted to the input-
output relation. Adversaries can also consider performing
an architecture exploration and train several substitute mod-
els before selecting the one yielding the highest misclas-
sification. In our research, we use an architecture similar
to one of those proposed by Urban et al., which they have
shown to be effective in training surrogate models (via dis-
tillation) and replicating the predictive performance of the
target model (Urban et al. 2016).
3.2 Adversarial Model Cascades
Inspired by the observation that adversarial examples trans-
fer between defended models, we propose Adversarial
Model Cascades(AMC) which trains a cascade of models
by injecting examples crafted from a local proxy model (or
the target model itself). The cascade trains a stack of mod-
els built sequentially, where each model in the cascade is
more robust than the one before. The key principle of our
approach is that each model in the cascade is optimized to
be secure against a combination of the attacks under con-
sideration, along with the attacks the model has encountered
during the previous iteration. Knowledge from the previous
model is leveraged via parameter transfer while securing the
model against subsequent attacks. This technique increases
the robustness of the next layer of the cascade, which ulti-
mately yields a model which is robust to all the attacks it
has been hardened against via the algorithm. A high-level
overview of the AMC framework is summarized in Algo-
rithm 2.
In the case of a white-box adversary, adversarial examples
Xadv are crafted for the corresponding model Mi (AMC,
target-hardened). For the case of an adaptive black-box ad-
versary (AMC, local proxy), adversarial examples are crafted
using an identical local proxy model P′i: the proxy adversar-
ially perturbs training data. This data is then concatenated
input: Undefended model M0, the training set D of size
N on which M0 was trained on, a set of attacks
S to harden against and the number of attacks E
begin
for i← 1 to E do
Initialize model parameters of Mi+1 to θM
i
θM
i+1 ← AT(S(i), D, N, η, θ)
end
Predict using the final model in the cascade :
yˆ = argmaxy ME(x);
end
Algorithm 2: A high-level overview of the AMC frame-
work. The algorithm works by transferring knowledge for
a specific attack and building upon it iteratively to increase
robustness.
with normal training data by the target model for training.
It is important to note that, for our approach to work in an
adaptive black-box scenario, we need access only to the pre-
diction interface of model Mi.
Forgetting Attacks Although AMC achieves a significant
increase in robustness against many attacks, it does not guar-
antee an increase in robustness against all of the attacks
which it has seen in the past. This condition is especially
true for attacks which were seen during the initial iterations
of the algorithm. To mitigate this problem, during the later
iterations we also need to make the model remember the ad-
versarial examples generated by attacks which were seen by
it during its initial iterations. Thus, while constructing ad-
versarial data per batch: instead of generating all perturbed
data using the current attack, the algorithm also uses attacks
it has seen so far into its run. This process implicitly weighs
the attacks, as the model ends up seeing more samples from
the attacks which it encounters during earlier iterations. As
a result, the loss function to compute its gradient (at a given
level E while running the cascade) becomes:
Jˆ(θ; ~x, y) = αJ(θ; ~x, y) + (1− α)
E∑
i=0
λiJ(θ; ~x
i
adv, y)
where λi are hyper-parameters, such that ∀i, λi ∈ [0, 1] and∑T
i=0 λi = 1. With the above scheme, we observe that the
resultant model remembers adversarial examples from at-
tacks which were introduced during the initial iterations as
well as recent ones, thus yielding better overall robustness.
Feature Squeezing In addition to the above, we also in-
vestigate the suitability of Feature Squeezing as a pre-
processing technique in the pipeline for improving the em-
pirical robustness of DNNs. It is important to note that Fea-
ture Squeezing as a stand-alone defence has shown to be
easily bypassed (Sharma and Chen 2018). When used in
conjunction with our framework, in contrast, we observe
that Feature Squeezing (quantization in particular) can ef-
fectively improve the accuracy against stronger attacks.
4 Experimental Setup
4.1 Datasets
To measure the performance of our proposed technique, we
run our experiments on three datasets standard in the com-
puter vision/machine learning community : MNIST (Lecun
and Cortes 1998), SVHN (Netzer et al. 2011) and CIFAR-
10 (Krizhevsky 2009).
For training proxy models, we used the following
datasets:
• MNIST: we generated additional data using the tech-
nique described by Loosli et al. (Loosli, Canu, and Bottou
2007).
• SVHN: we used images from the additional set of exam-
ples available in the SVHN dataset.
• CIFAR-10: we used images from STL-10 (Coates, Ng,
and Lee 2011) dataset corresponding to labels that are
present in CIFAR-10. For the remaining classes (‘frog‘),
we picked images from Imagenet (Russakovsky et al.
2015) database. All of these were down-sampled to
32×32 pixels.
To ensure a fair comparison, all the target (including
AMC), as well as proxy models, were trained such that they
all had accuracies within the same ballpark (Table 2).
4.2 Data Preprocessing
All pixels are scaled to [0, 1]. We employ the following split
strategies for all of the three datasets:
• Training data from the original dataset is used as it is for
training.
• Test data from the original dataset is split into two por-
tions. 30% of this is used as validation data by the target
model while training itself. Further, 30% of the remaining
70% data, i.e., 21% of the original test data, is reserved
while performing attacks. The remaining data is used as a
test set for testing generalizability.
• The attacker obtains data at its level for training itself
(dataset-wise, described in Section 4.1). That is, the data
used by the proxy is independent of the target model.
Such a data acquisition scheme closely resembles a prac-
tical scenario, where the adversary may obtain data all by
itself. The data used at all stages is balanced class-wise.
Data-augmentation, similar to that described by Urban et
al., is used for CIFAR10 and SVHN to help prevent over-
fitting (Urban et al. 2016).
AMC Hyper-parameters At the ith iteration, we perturb
80% of the data using the ith attack, while the remaining
20% data is perturbed equally, in a non-overlapping fashion,
by all previous attacks. Using this strategy yields a ratio of
1.6625: 1.1625: 1.0375: 1 of the total perturbed data points
seen by the model across all runs combined. The order of at-
tacks used while running both variations of AMC is: FGSM,
VAP, EAP, PGM.
4.3 Attack Hyperparameters
Based on a trade-off between attack rates and visual inspect-
ing perturbed images, we arrived at the hyperparameters
mentioned in Table 1 for all our experiments. All adversar-
ial data was clipped in the range [0,1], since all the trained
models expect input in this range.
Attack MNIST SVHN CIFAR10
FGSM
eps 1e-1 1e-1 (3e-1,6e-2)
EAP
beta 1e-2 1e-2 1e-2
binary steps (5,7) (1,3) (1,9)
max iterations (8,15) (5,10) (5,1e3)
initial const 1e-3 3e-1 (1e-1,1e-3)
learning rate 1e-1 2e-1 (1e-1,1e-2)
PGM
eps 3e-1 1e-1 (1e-1,3e-2)
nb iter (15,20) 5 (5,40)
VAP
xi 1 (1e-6,1e-4) 1e-6
num iters (6,10) (1,3) 1
eps (5,8) (2,3) 2
Table 1: Attack hyperparameters for white-box and black-
box attacks used throughout in experiments. Hyperparam-
eter names here refer to the ones in the Cleverhans li-
brary. Tuples indicate parameters for (white-box,black-box),
whereas single entries signify the same hyperparameter for
both cases.
4.4 Evaluation Setup
We evaluate the effectiveness of our approach against adap-
tive black-box adversaries as follows:
1. We train two local proxy models (P′ & P′′): (P′) is used to
strengthen (or harden) the target model and (P′′) is used
to measure the robustness of the hardened models to ad-
versarial attacks. These models are replicas of each other
since they have the same architecture and are trained over
the same dataset.
2. To test the effectiveness of the model hardening algo-
rithms, we generate adversarial examples for the local
proxy model P′′ using white-box strategies and attack the
target model with these examples.
Proxy Model Architecture The architecture of the proxy
model comprises of 4 convolutional layers and 2 dense lay-
ers, using ReLU activations and dropout [0.4, 0.3, 0.2], along
with 2 × 2 max pooling after every 2 convolutional layers.
This architecture is similar to the one mentioned in (Urban et
al. 2016). The same architecture is used for all three datasets,
with changes in input shape accordingly.
Black Box Model Architectures For CIFAR-10 and
SVHN, we used ResNet32 (He et al. 2016) while for
MNIST, we used LeNet (LeCun et al. 1998).
Model MNIST SVHN CIFAR10
Undefended 0.9 3.3 9.5
Adv. Training 1.4 2.7 10.4
Adv. Training [P] 1.1 3.2 11.7
AMC,target-hardened 1.4 1.3 9.3
AMC,local proxy 1.1 3.5 9.9
Proxy 0.2 6.0 17.1
Table 2: Error rates (lower is better) for various target and
proxy models trained by us. Proxy here corresponds to the
proxy trained with access to only class-labels returned by
the target model. Adv. Training and Adv. Training[P] sig-
nify accuracies for models trained with adversarial training
and proxy-based adversarial training, averaged over the four
attacks.
5 Empirical Results
We conducted multiple experiments, proving the efficiency
of our method against several attacks, both in white-box
and black-box setups. AMC, target-hardened uses adversar-
ial examples generated from the target model and AMC, lo-
cal proxy generates them using a local proxy. We evaluated
the performance of our approach on all the three datasets
listed above, for popular white-box attack algorithms such
as FGSM, PGM, and compared them with both variations
of our proposed framework (Section 3.2). Accuracies for the
models used in our experiments are given in Table 2. Note
that there is a slight drop in accuracies for the case of ad-
versarial hardening, which has been reported widely in liter-
ature (Madry et al. 2017; Dhillon et al. 2018). Despite this
fact, models trained with AMC have generalization accura-
cies as good as an undefended model, which is yet another
advantage over plain adversarial training.
The drop in accuracy for the proxy model on CIFAR-10
can be attributed to the significant difference in the distri-
butions of data used by the proxy and target models. Pa-
rameters for the attacks we tested were decided upon after
analyzing the adversarial images produced, using them. We
visually inspected some of the generated examples to make
sure that they are not just noise, while at the same time trying
to maximize error induced in the target model*.
We compare our proposed framework (both variations
mentioned in Section 3.2) with the best adversarially trained
model in terms of empirical robustness for each of the attack.
5.1 White-Box Attacks
We observe that AMC, target-hardened, on an average, gives
higher empirical robustness (accuracy on adversarial ex-
amples). Average robustness here refers to the robustness
against all four attacks averaged together. We also observed
that models obtained via adversarial hardening against only
one kind of attack did not improve robustness against other
attacks; whereas our models are robust against all the attacks
we considered (Table 3).
*We used Cleverhans (https://cleverhans.readthedocs.io/en/latest/)
for implementing these attacks and Tensorflow
(https://www.tensorflow.org/) for training models
Model White-Box AttacksF E P V
MNIST
Undefended 85.4 86.6 88.9 69.3
FGSM 5.5 51.2 65.9 42.4
EAP 74.2 15.4 66.4 50.4
PGM 31.6 27.0 4.4 33.1
VAP 27.6 40.6 64.6 19.6
AMC,target-hardened 5.1 8.4 3.1 3.2
SVHN
Undefended 75.7 95.0 97.6 34.6
FGSM 2.7 94.2 94.5 36.9
EAP 91.6 8.4 91.56 89.9
PGM 31.6 58.3 29.3 49.3
VAP 26.7 83.6 94.3 15.8
AMC,target-hardened 2.4 4.9 25.1 4.5
CIFAR10
Undefended 86.2 94.4 97.2 94.4
FGSM 12.0 94.5 95.1 36.5
EAP 90.0 30.1 96.7 50.5
PGM 30.7 35.4 63.5 29.3
VAP 28.9 70.5 92.1 13.0
AMC,target-hardened 10.6 23.9 62.5 11.0
Table 3: Error rates (lower is better) for various defenses
against white-box attacks. We can see AMC,target-hardened
performing better than adversarial training. Attacks {F, E, P,
V} here correspond to {FGSM, EAP, PGM, VAP} respec-
tively. It is important to note that we compare our model
(AMC) with the best model in terms of empirical robustness
for each of the attack.
5.2 Black-Box Attacks
For the adversary’s proxy models, we consider adaptive
proxies trained using three possible predictive interfaces.
Given an example x, the target models predictive interface
returns:
1. only the most likely label yˆ,
2. only the most likely label yˆ and adds label noise to it (to
approximate distillation), or
3. a vector of tuples containing class conditional probabili-
ties p(yi|x) and the corresponding label yi.
Even in the case of black-box attacks, irrespective of the
predictive interface made available by the target model, we
observe trends similar to that of white-box attacks. The first
type of proxy, i.e. the one that assumes only class-labels, is
under the most generic scenario and thus best resembles a
real-world black box setting. Results for this proxy are sum-
marized in Table 4. We observed similar trends for the other
two kinds of proxy models. Robustness of models trained
with AMC (AMC,local proxy) is, on an average, higher than
adversarial training.
5.3 Variations of AMC
To assert the importance of parameter transfer across itera-
tions in our AMC algorithm, we also ran AMC with the con-
figuration where there is no parameter transfer across the
models in the cascade, i.e., (Mi+1 ← θM0 ). As expected, we
Model Black-Box AttacksF E P V
MNIST
Undefended 83.2 8.7 81.9 30.9
FGSM[P] 17.2 3.68 25.1 21.3
EAP[P] 82.3 1.5 52.3 28.8
PGM[P] 52.6 3.78 21.3 4.5
VAP[P] 31.3 4.0 39.5 27.03
AMC, local proxy 18.2 1.3 20.8 2.4
SVHN
Undefended 72.7 18.8 71.4 31.4
FGSM[P] 62.2 15.1 67.4 27.4
EAP[P] 70.8 12.9 68.6 29.1
PGM[P] 64.3 11.4 54.0 25.9
VAP[P] 69.4 15.8 54.7 26.8
AMC, local proxy 55.3 8.8 44.5 19.9
CIFAR10
Undefended 66.9 16.0 44.6 36.4
FGSM[P] 65.4 16.0 43.7 35.1
EAP[P] 66.6 16.0 44.2 35.4
PGM[P] 65.6 18.3 43.6 35.1
VAP[P] 65.8 16.2 43.7 34.8
AMC, local proxy 59.2 16.1 41.3 30.7
Table 4: Error rates (lower is better) for various defenses
against black-box attacks. The tag [P] signifies hardening
with examples generated with a local proxy. We can see
AMC, local proxy performing better than proxy-based ad-
versarial training. Attacks {F, E, P, V} here correspond to
{FGSM, EAP, PGM, VAP} respectively. It is important to
note that we compare our model (AMC) with the best model
in terms of empirical robustness for each of the attack.
observe the performance of the model to be dismal in the
above case.
Since the algorithm processes attacks across cascades se-
quentially, one would expect this order to make a difference.
To test this intuition, we tried two orders: sorted and re-
verse sorted by the power of attacks observed in the liter-
ature, i.e., FGSM, VAP, EAP, PGM and its reverse order.
We observed higher robustness for models trained with the
first order. Even though the ratio of attack data seen across
runs is more-or-less equal, it is slightly higher for attacks
seen earlier on in the algorithm. Scheduling stronger attacks
first seems more intuitive, but it also adds the possibility of
over-fitting to that attack.
5.4 Generalizing to an unseen Attack
Feature Squeezing Feature Squeezing (Xu, Evans, and Qi
2017) is an input pre-processing technique that re-scales in-
puts to get rid of high frequency, potentially adversarial,
noise. It has been shown to help achieve slightly nudged
accuracies on adversarial inputs. To evaluate the compati-
bility and advantage of Feature Squeezing on top of models
trained with AMC, we calculate robustness numbers using
this technique. (Table 5).
We calculated these numbers for EAP and PGM attacks;
for the hyper-parameters used in earlier sections (Table 1)
as well as higher parameters (doubled ’nb iter’ and ’eps’
for PGM, ’binary steps’ and ’max iterations’ for EAP) to
Datset Normal StrongerEAP PGM EAP PGM
MNIST
AMC 8.4 3.1 89.7 98.8
AMC and FS 3.1 2.9 44.6 6.73
SVHN
AMC 4.9 25.1 94.2 98.1
AMC and FS 2.1 10.1 39.3 40.5
CIFAR10
AMC 23.9 62.5 93.9 97.6
AMC and FS 19.2 49.6 36.9 38.2
Table 5: Error rates (lower is better) for AMC with Feature
Squeezing for white-box attacks for both normal and high-
attack rate hyperparameters.
achieve higher error rates. It is important to note that Feature
Squeezing as a stand-alone defence has shown to be easily
bypassed (Sharma and Chen 2018). When used in conjunc-
tion with our framework, in contrast, we observe that Fea-
ture Squeezing (quantization in particular) can effectively
improve the accuracy against stronger attacks, samples from
which weren’t previously seen by the model.
Leave one attack out validation To study the capability
of models trained via AMC to generalize, we test it against
an unseen attack: we use n− 1 attacks for running AMC,
and the nth one for performing attacks. We experimented
using FGSM as the unseen attack in a white-box setting. For
all datasets, models trained with AMC outperformed unde-
fended models significantly in terms of robustness (Table 6).
These numbers are, on an average, better than all of the de-
fence methods (apart from hardening against FGSM, since
in that case the attack is known before-hand) in Table 3.
Model FGSM White-box
MNIST
Undefended 85.4
AMC(with PGM, EAP and VAP) 15.4
AMC(with PGM, EAP and VAP) and FS 14.8
SVHN
Undefended 75.7
AMC(with PGM, EAP and VAP) 12.1
AMC(with PGM, EAP and VAP) and FS 11.0
CIFAR10
Undefended 86.2
AMC(with PGM, EAP and VAP) 24.7
AMC(with PGM, EAP and VAP) and FS 23.9
Table 6: Error rates (lower is better) for models trained with
AMC on PGM, VAP and EAP in a white-box setting. When
compared against the undefended model, we can see that
AMC is performing better against FGSM attack, which it
hasn’t seen during training. Using Feature Squeezing (FS) in
conjunction with AMC further brings the error rates down.
6 Discussion
As we observed in our experiments, there is no defence tech-
nique that works against all adversarial attacks which are ef-
fective for complex datasets such as SVHN and CIFAR10;
hardening a model for a specific attack does not necessarily
lead to an increase in robustness against future attacks of that
kind. Adversarial training, as we observed, increased robust-
ness only against the attack it is hardened against and did not
substantially increase robustness against other attacks sig-
nificantly.
The key contributions of the AMC framework proposed in
the paper are as follows :
1. AMC provides robustness against all the attacks it is hard-
ened against, making it an all-in-one defence mechanism
against several attacks.
• In the case of white-box attacks, on an average AMC
provides an absolute increase in robustness of 6.225%
for MNIST, 5.075% for SVHN and 2.65% for CI-
FAR10, in comparison to adversarial hardening.
• In the case of black-box attacks, on an average AMC
provides an absolute increase in robustness of 0.45%
for MNIST, 6.25% for SVHN and 2.7% for CIFAR10,
in comparison to local-proxy based adversarial harden-
ing.
2. Even though Feature Squeezing has been shown to be by-
passed, when used in conjunction with our framework, we
observe that Feature Squeezing (quantization in particu-
lar) can effectively improve the robustness against both
attacks seen by the model during the training (on an av-
erage, an absolute increase of 2.65% for MNIST, 8.9%
for SVHN and 8.8% for CIFAR10) and stronger attacks
which weren’t previously seen by the model (on an aver-
age, an absolute increase of 68.9% for MNIST, 56.25%
for SVHN and 58.2% for CIFAR10) on top of AMC.
3. There is no overhead at inference time. Thus, services can
deploy versions of the models hardened with AMC with-
out any compromise on latency.
4. It is easy to incorporate into already trained models. As
the intermediate step in building the model cascades in-
volves fine-tuning , it is much faster than existing defen-
sive methods which require training from scratch for ev-
ery attack.
5. As opposed to the performance of models from Madry
et. al. (Madry et al. 2017) the resultant model does not
compromise on predictive performance on the unseen test
set (Table 2).
6. We also observe that the performance of AMC for unseen
attacks is comparable to models hardened against those
specific attacks (Table 6). An interesting direction for fu-
ture would be to evaluate the performance of AMC over a
larger set of unseen attacks.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first attempt to
provide an end to end pipeline to improve robustness against
multiple adversarial attacks simultaneously; in both white-
box and black-box settings.
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